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Abstract 
This discussion paper considers corporate governance issues associated with executive 
compensation arrangements. An historical perspective is used to demonstrate the absence 
of a sound empirically-based understanding of good corporate governance practices in 
relation to share-based payment arrangements. The paper provides an overview of issues 
including the potential earnings dilution and volatility effects of the introduction of 
regulations affecting executive remuneration. Potential future research questions have 
been framed addressing each of the major issues identified in this paper. We conclude 
that corporate regulators should ensure they are familiar with and consider best practice 
models for corporate governance when developing new, or revising existing business 
regulation. It is proposed that further research to remedy this deficiency would enable a 
more accurate assessment of the impact of management on accounting regulation and the 
better design and implementation of regulation. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The structure and amount of remuneration paid to corporate executives is an issue that 
has attracted much attention in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC). Concern has 
been raised over whether the remuneration of executives is excessive and whether the 
form of executive remuneration encourages appropriate behaviour. There have also been 
calls to promote accountability by providing for more transparent and additional 
disclosure of many aspects of executive remuneration arrangements. 
There is evidence of some diversity in the management and reporting of share-based 
payment. Although the use of share-based payment has been a growing trend since the 
1970s there is as yet, relatively little academically-based literature on the methodologies 
used for the corporate governance of such arrangements. This implies that limited 
scholarly assessment and evaluation has been conducted in this area. 
There are two main objectives in this paper. The first is to argue that there is a need for a 
sound empirically-based understanding of how firms manage share-based payment 
arrangements. The second objective is to develop research questions, based on important 
issues emerging in the literature, as a guide to future research in this area. Carroll (2006) 
suggests that further research into the management of regulation within the firm is 
important as it is likely to improve our understanding of the impact of management on 
regulatory compliance. In particular, it should enhance our understanding of how a new 
accounting regulation, such as the Bangladesh Financial Reporting Standard (BFRS-2 
Share-based payment (BFRS2) has been managed within Bangladeshi firms. Further 
research should also facilitate the design of more efficient and effective regulation and of 
best practice in the management of regulation. It is expected that this discussion and the 
emerging data from related studies will be of interest to both academics and professionals 
active in the corporate governance and regulatory arenas. 
This remainder of this paper is divided into two major sections. In the next section an 
assessment is made of the literature to support the claim that only a limited understanding 
of the corporate governance of share-based payment within the firm exists. In the 
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following section a number of future research questions are developed with special 
reference to Bangladesh. 
2.0 Share-based Payment Arrangements 
The issue of equity instruments to employees as a form of remuneration is not new (Gray 
2006; Ledden 2006). Share-option plans in particular are now a common feature of 
executive payment. They have also been extended to other employee levels as a means of 
aligning employees' interests with those of the firm, and encouraging employee retention. 
2.1 Scope of Share-Based Payment under Bangladesh Financial Reporting 
Standards (BFRS2) 
The concept of share-based payments is broader than employee share options. BFRS 2 
encompasses the issuance of shares, or rights to shares, in return for services and goods. 
Examples of items included in the scope of BFRS 2 are share appreciation rights, 
employee share purchase plans, employee share ownership plans, share option plans and 
plans where the issuance of shares (or rights to shares) may depend on market or non-
market related conditions. However, the accounting standard does not apply to share-
based payment transactions other than for the acquisition of goods and services. Share 
dividends, the purchase of treasury shares, and the issuance of additional shares are 
therefore outside its scope. 
Under BFRS2, all share-based payment transactions must be recognised in the firm's 
financial statements. The view adopted in this accounting regulation is that all share-
based payment transactions ultimately lead to expense recognition. Thus, firms are 
. . . 
required to reflect the effects of such transactions in profit or loss. Before BFRS2 there 
was no accounting requirement to identify the expenses associated with share-based 
payment transactions or to measure and recognise such transactions in a firm's financial 
statements. The imposition of this new accounting regulation shows the success of the 
regulators in arguing that recognising the cost of share-based payment in financial 
statements improves the relevance, reliability and comparability of the financial 
information, helps users of financial information to understand better the economic 
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transactions affecting an enterprise, and supports resource allocation decisions (F ASB 
2004a). 
2.2 The Nature of Share-based Payment Arrangements 
In a share-based payment arrangement equity instruments, commonly share options, are 
issued to employees as a component of a remuneration package. The equity instrument 
give the employee the' right to purchase the employer firm's shares usually at a 
discounted price in exchange for their own services (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2004). The 
value of share options is reflected in the market value of the firm's shares. The firm 
issues (grants) the share options at an exercise (buying) price which is usually the same 
as the current market price of the underlying shares at a celtain date. The option gives the 
holder a right to buy shares at the exercise price during a certain period (the 'option' 
period). A change in the firm's share price will affect the value of its share options. If the 
share price increases so that the exercise price is lower than the market value of the 
underlying shares, the option-holder (employee) makes a gain. On the other hand, if the 
share price falls below the exercise price a rational employee will not exercise the 
options. Theoretically, this phenomenon creates an incentive for employee participants in 
the share-based payment arrangements to align their work-related effOlts to the firm's 
wealth maximisation objectives. 
A useful historical synopsis of the development of share-based payment is provided in 
Fisher and Wise (2006a). Their synopsis is reproduced in appendix 1. The relatively 
broad chronology of dates and events they provide is useful for understanding the 
increasingly popular use of share-based payment as a component of employee payment. 
The emergence of share options is dated to the 1920s. It was not until much later that the 
use of share options as a component of employee payment emerged. This is linked to the 
reduction, in the United States (US), of taxes on the sale of shares in the 1950s. The 
chronology suggests that share options remained largely irrelevant until the early 1970s 
when, submitting to intense opposition, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(F ASB) declined to mandate the expensing of share options. This event aroused 
awareness of the potential to use share options as a component of executive payment. The 
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broader use of share options for employee payment appears to flow from Microsoft 
Corporation's decision to extend these arrangements to all its full-time employees. By the 
1990s the use of share options as a component of employee payment was widespread. 
Then, in the late 1990s, corporate regulators began to issue warnings about the potential 
overstatement of firms' earnings due to the non-recognition of share options. The 
'dot.com' boom-bust era emphasises this effect. In 2001 Enron Corporation failed and its 
chief executive officer testified before the US Congress about the importance of 
executive share options in the failure. In 2003 Microsoft Corporation abandoned its 
employee share options arrangements in favour of share award plans. Much more 
recently, regulators have moved to mandate the expensing of share options: in 
Bangladesh; this took effect from 1 July 2007 with the adoption of BFRS2 based on the 
international financial reporting standards IFRS2 Share-based Payment (IFRS2). In 
Bangladesh, the IFRS standards began to be adopted progressively for reporting periods 
effective from 1 January 2007. 
Table - 1: Adoption Status 
Source: Deloitte lAS Plus, August 2007. 
This chronology of events, particularly the introduction and then abandonment of 
employee share options by Microsoft Corporation and the abuses concerning this type of 
employee payment by Enron Corporation, highlights the absence of a sound conceptual 
basis guiding the corporate governance of share-based payment. There is a pressing need 
to identify available corporate governance standards appropriate for addressing the 
mandatory requirements of BFRS2, and then use these corporate governance standards to 
undertake a comprehensive study of their performance for financial reporting in this area. 
The results of such research should, in turn, inform the development of 'best practice' 
methodologies for corporate governance of share-based payment in Bangladesh and other 
nations. 
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3.0 A Review of the Literature 
A review of the emerging literature has revealed a number of important developments 
where future research may improve our understanding of issues affecting the corporate 
governance of share-based payment. These areas are identified and discussed and a series 
of research questions has been formulated as a guide for future research into each of these 
issues. 
Bhattachmjee and Islam (2009) argue that for Bangladesh to achieve a high-quality 
corporate financial reporting environment depends on the effectiveness of its enforcement 
mechanisms. Merely adopting international accounting and auditing standards is not 
enough. They argue that three important links exist in the enforcement sequence: (a) 
directors and top management must ensure that financial statements are prepared in 
compliance with established standards; (b) auditors must act independently and 
judiciously to ensure that financial statements comply with applicable accounting 
standards and represent a true and fair position of the enterprise's financial condition; and 
(c) regulators, both self-regulatory organisations and statutory regulators, must 
implement arrangements for efficient monitoring of regulatory compliance and 
consistently take appropriate actions against violators. 
Hossain, Haque and Haider (2004) pointed out that the Bangladesh accounting standards 
board pursues mandatory compliance with the local accounting standards by requiring 
companies to prepare their financial statements strictly in accordance with the prescribed 
accounting standards. Ali, Ahmed and Eddie (2009), using a large sample of listed 
companies that included Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, found that the extent of 
adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) was mixed. They noted that 
there are a number of areas where both measurement and disclosure adoption is low. 
They argued that this is due to a lack of awareness of the treatment of issues and a lack of 
enforcement of the standards. They concluded that South Asian companies are not 
sufficiently complying with IFRS and need to improve the extent of their adoption. 
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3.1 Economic Significance and Earnings Volatility 
A significant emerging issue brought about by Bangladesh's Institute of Chartered 
Accountant's objective of fostering acceptance and observance of international financial 
reporting standards (ICAB 2010) is the consideration of how firms should account for 
payments that are linked to their share values. The international accounting standard 
IFRS2 and the Bangladesh version, BFRS 2 Share-based Payment regulate this matter. 
IFRS2 (and consequently BFRS2) mandates the recognition in financial reports of the 
goods and services acquired or received under share-based payment arrangements that 
are settled in either cash or equity regardless of whether the counterparty involved is an 
employee or other party (Wise 2005). Prior to the introduction of this requirement firms 
were able to ignore these transactions or they simply provided footnote disclosure in their 
financial statements. This situation has been fundamentally altered with the cost of such 
transactions now required to be included directly in the determination of earnings 
(BFRS2 paragraph 8). Accordingly, Picker et al. (2009) make a general prediction that 
the introduction of an accounting standard regulating share-based payments will lower 
the earnings of firms which are significant users of share-based payment transactions as a 
means of compensating their employees. Earlier, Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) made a 
similar prediction. Given the potential significance of this particular regulatory change to 
firms participating in share-based payment transactions, it is impOltant to understand both 
the consequences for a firm's financial results and the corporate governance issues in the 
use and management of such financial tools. 
As BFRS 2 requires the use of fair value for share-based payments it introduces the 
potential for earnings volatility. This result occurs because the cost of equity instruments 
issued under a share-based payment arrangement is measured as the difference between 
the current market value and the exercise price of the equity instrument at the valuation 
date. Kitney and Buffini (2006) provide some anecdotal evidence that when IFRS2, was 
adopted in Australia (AIFRS 2004) it introduced non-trivial volatility to firms' results. 
Volatility, they imply, is confusing to investors and likely to undermine corporate 
credibility. Thus, if the earnings and/or volatility impact is significant it is predicted that 
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firms will manage earnings in order to avoid adverse consequences. 
Fisher and Wise (2006b) investigated the economic significance of the dilution effect of 
IFRS 2 on the reported earnings of a small selection of listed Australian firms. In their 
study, the annual cost of share-based payment arrangements was measured and the 
relative impact on earnings determined. Their results suggested a dilution effect of 
between 1.7 and 2 percent of earnings. Despite this relatively low average dilution effect, 
they noted that for individual firms, the new accounting regulation appeared to introduce 
considerable volatility in earnings and suggested that this volatility may provide a 
disincentive to the use of share-based payment. Accordingly, the major research question 
addressed by Fisher and Wise (2006b), and earlier by Chalmers and Godfrey (2005), 
could be extended to listed Bangladeshi firms in order to determine the full extent to 
which earnings may have been diluted by the introduction ofBFRS2. 
While mmImIsmg a potentially adverse impact on earnings is likely to provide an 
important incentive to avoid share-based payment arrangements, firms are also likely to 
select low-impact arrangements or to alter pre-existing arrangements to minimise dilution 
effects. Thus, the introduction of BFRS2 with its requirement to recognise the cost of 
share-based payments in earnings may provide sufficient incentive for management 
intervention to mitigate potential adverse effects including avoidance of share-based 
payment, dismantling and/or restructuring existing arrangements, or selecting new 
arrangements so as to minimise adverse earnings consequences. The following research, 
which if applied to the earnings data of Bangladeshi finns are likely to provide a better 
understanding of corporate governance practice in this regard. 
1. What is the earnings effect of share-based payment an'angements on listed finns? 
2. Have firms selected low earnings/volatility impact share-based payment 
arrangements? 
3. Have firms restructured adverse earnmgs impact share-based payment 
arrangements (as Microsoft did) to reduce earnings dilution? 
4. Have firms dismantled or discontinued pre-BFRS 2 share-based payment 
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arrangements in order to avoid an earnings impact? 
3.2 Incentive Arrangements 
The opportunistic perspective of positive accounting theory suggests that share-based 
payment arrangements will provide an effective bonding mechanism for the linking of 
employee performance with reward. The efficiency of this strategy may be affected by 
the introduction of the requirement, in BFRS2, to include the cost of share-based 
payment arrangements directly in earnings. Understanding strategic reaction to regulatory 
change is an important patt of gaining a full understanding of regulatory impact and 
determining appropriate corporate governance practice. Paskelian and Said (2010) 
observe that government ownership of China's listed firms is awakening awareness of 
the pay-performance link for top managers and thus possibly making China's listed firms 
less effective in solving the opportunistic agency problem. They argue that such effects 
exist for both direct government ownership though state shares and indirect government 
ownership though legal person shares. They found that private ownership seems to 
strengthen the pay-perfonnance link compared to government ownership and collective 
ownership. 
The extent to which firms will continue with share-based payment arrangements in the 
regulatory context of BFRS 2 is unclear. If a firm engages in share-based payment 
transactions its reported earnings and balance sheet are affected. This in turn affects any 
earnings-related ratios and some balance sheet ratios. For instance, share-based payment 
incentives affect the earnings per share ratio in the following manner. If an employee 
chooses to exercise the right to buy shares the number of outstanding shares will increase: 
there follows a decrease in earnings per share as net income is divided across a greater 
number of shares. Thus shareholders pay for a share-based payment program through a 
dilution of their ownership. Additionally, the market value of their shares suffers a 
dilution effect as a result of the additional shares issued. On the other hand, the 'pay-for-
performance' rationale embraces the view that share-based payment will enhance, not 
diminish, shareholder value as employees have an incentive to align their work-related 
efforts with the firm's objectives. 
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There is relatively little discussion of the link between positive accounting theory and 
share-based payment evident in the literature, particularly for emerging economies such 
as Bangladesh. Further academic consideration of this conflict would strengthen the 
literature and promote a better understanding of corporate governance issues relative to 
share-based payment arrangements. Accordingly the following questions are posed for 
future research. 
5. Is there a systemic difference in the incidence of performance-related share-based 
payment arrangements in the pre- and post- BFRS 2 periods? 
6. Are share-based payment arrangements efficient mechanisms for the optimisation 
of shareholder value? 
3.3 Pay-for-Performance 
As dis~ussed above, one of the theoretical underpinnings for the current popularity of 
share-based payment is the view that such arrangements provide an incentive for 
employees to align their work-related efforts to the firm's wealth maximisation 
objectives. This may be a reasonable assumption if employees carry the risk burden 
attaching to share-based payment instruments such as share options. However, employees 
may be able to hedge these instruments and effectively remove the risk of their holdings 
in their employer's equities. Buffini (2006) reports some views relating to this matter. 
"If you have at-risk remuneration without risk, you defeat the whole purpose 0 
aligning executive and shareholders interests" (Mather R, BT Governance 
Advisory Service). 
" ... hedging unvested incentives should be barred and hedging vested incentives 
should be disclosed." " ... where executives are held out to have a similar interest to 
shareholders because they have a large shareholding or options, and if they have 
... hedged out the risk, ... that is a misleading statement" (Balzer F, Australian 
Shareholders Association). 
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"They are supposed to be at risk, so that (hedging) shouldn't be allowed ... but 
once they are the property of the individual, and so long as they disclose what 
they've done, they're free to dispose of them" (Evans R, Australian Institute of 
Company Directors). 
Clearly, a theoretical consideration of the implications of hedging by employees of their 
risk in respect to share-based payment arrangements, will contribute significantly to the 
development of an appropriate corporate governance methodology for such practices. 
The following research question may provide a useful starting point for further research 
of this matter. 
7. What are the theoretical and corporate governance implications for the hedging of 
share-based payment instruments by employees? 
3.4 Principles Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards 
Accounting standards provide a guideline for reporting a firm's economic transactions 
and events (McCombie & Deo 2005). When preparing financial reports on a firm's 
performance, accountants must follow the requirements of the relevant accounting 
standards. Principles-based accounting standards require subjective judgment as to their 
appropriate application, and little is yet known as to how consistent the application will 
be with the objectives of the accounting standards. A major change brought about by the 
introduction of IFRS2 (and its national equivalent, BFRS2), is the consideration of how 
entities should account for payments that are tied in some way to share values (Emanuel 
2005). 
Principles-based standards 'can have more than one valid interpretation' (Kitney & 
Buffini 2006, p.l). Kitney and Buffini (2006, p.ll) also quote Ernst and Young partner, 
Ruth Picker, as suggesting that' ... answers may change as we become more sophisticated 
in interpreting IFRS ... and some companies may have restatements of their accounts ... '. 
Evidence of the need to restate financial statements as a result of the application of new 
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accounting standards regulating share-based payment has already emerged in the US. 
Bloomberg (2006) reported that McAfee, the US's second largest maker of anti-virus 
computer software, declared that it would have to restate its results after a review of its 
stock option grants. McAfee is one of more than70 companies in the US whose option-
granting practices were examined by either the Securities Exchange Commission or the 
Justice Department. The inquiries were in relation to whether options were backdated to 
raise value to their recipients. 
FUliher evidence that corporate governance of share-based payment may not be robust is 
clear in the case ofNephros Inc., a US medical device company. Nephros announced (in 
August 2006) that it would be restating its quarterly financial statements to reflect a 
correction related to stock-based payment expense and filing an amended quarterly report 
with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. The company stated that it had 
identified a material weakness in its internal control over financial reporting relating to 
this item which it is in the process of remedying. It said that as a result of an error 'the 
previously reported financial statements should no longer be relied upon' (PR Newswire 
2006). The error occurred during the process of adopting the new standard for accounting 
for stock options under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.123 (Revised 
2004), 'Share-based Payment'. An overstatement was made in the non-cash stock-based 
employee payment expense. Additionally, the company announced that it had not 
properly allocated the expense among the research and development and selling, general 
and administrative expense categories. 
The appropriate interpretation and application of accounting standards is a corporate 
governance issue that is usually managed by firms through emb"edded internal control 
structures and processes. Al Farooque, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim (2007) examined the 
effect of board ownership on firm performance in Bangladesh and found that ownership 
and performance are endogenously determined and there is either a reverse-way or two-
way causality relationship between the two. They argue for strengthening the internal 
control mechanisms within listed firms in Bangladesh. Of interest in this discussion paper 
is the strength and reliability of such corporate governance mechanisms in the 
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management of new and often complex accounting standards such as those relating to 
share-based payment arrangements. The following research question has been framed to 
commence an examination of this issue. 
8. Are there systemic differences between corporate governance issues for 
principles'-based and rules-based accounting standards relating to share-based 
payment? 
3.5 Grant Conditions 
Share option granting practices are under intense scrutiny as questions are raised about 
the propriety of the timing of the grants, repricing, and the manner in which the strike 
price is set (Bloomberg 2006). The propriety of share-based payment transactions is 
particularly open to criticism where the exercise of share option grants occurs shortly 
before significant share price increases or coincide with what appear to be abnormally 
low share price levels (Business Week Online 2006). Further, some firms have backdated 
the pricing of executive share options to reflect the changing market values of their 
shares. Attempts to regulate this area include the requirement in BFRS2 of disclosure of 
all the significant terms and conditions of executive share-based payment arrangements. 
Of interest to researchers in this area is whether corporate regulators will prohibit or 
otherwise restrict the back-dating of share options issued under share-based payment 
arrangements. A useful research question might be framed as follows. 
9. What are the corporate governance implications of grant conditions permitting the 
back-dating and/or repricing of share-based payment instruments? 
3.6 Share buy-backs 
Firms are able to use their cash reserves to buy-back shares, and the incidence of share-
buy backs has increased as firms enjoy record levels of cash and have become net savers 
(Nowicki 2006). In addition to signalling a preference by firms to return cash reserves to 
shareholders and reluctance on the part of firms to invest, this strategy may be indicative 
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of an attempt to avoid the earnings dilution that accompanies the exercise of employee 
share options. Accordingly, the following research question is posed. 
10. What are the implications for corporate governance of share-based payment, of 
the return of capital to shareholders via share-buy backs? 
3.7 Share-Based payments with Non-Employees 
BFRS2 focuses on share-based payment transactions with both employees and other 
providers of goods and services. No discussion of share-based payments with parties 
other than employees was detected in the literature review conducted for the purposes of 
this paper. This suggests that the use of share-based payments with non-employees is 
likely to be trivial and brings into question the need for such transactions to be directly 
regulated through an accounting standard. The following research question may assist in 
further understanding this matter. 
11. What is the incidence of non-employee share-based payment relative to share-
based payment arrangements for employees? 
3.8 Disclosure 
Some regulators (FASB 2004) and commentators (Buffini 2006) have called for more 
extensive disclosure in relation to share-based payment arrangements. As an example, US 
companies now have to disclose the amount paid to executives under new rules adopted 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
"SEC commissioners have approved the first major changes in pay regulations for 
14 years, requiring US companies to reveal at least as much as European 
companies about boardroom pay packages." (The Guardian 2006) 
The adequacy or otherwise of disclosure of these matters by Bangladesh firms is not yet 
clear from the results of annual financial reporting subsequent to the introduction of 
BFRS2. However, Islam, AI-Hossienie and AI-Baki (2010) argue that most Bangladesh 
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finance companies are disclosing most mandated information which they say is evidence 
of good corporate governance. They argue that the improvement in corporate governance 
of finance companies is the result of recent government initiatives. An empirical 
examination of the share-based payment disclosures made by Bangladesh firms in their 
post-BFRS2 annual reports has the potential to make a valuable contribution to the 
corporate governance literature. To assist in addressing this matter, the following 
research question has been framed. 
12. What is the level/measure of disclosure about share-based payment? 
4.0 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper focuses on the corporate governance issues associated with share-based 
payment arrangements. An historical perspective is used to demonstrate the absence of a 
sound theoretical basis for determining appropriate corporate governance practices in 
relation to share-based payment arrangements. A number of emerging issues, including 
the potential earnings dilution and volatility effects of the introduction of new accounting 
regulation in BFRS2 were considered. Potential research questions have been framed 
addressing each of the major emerging issues identified in this paper. Corporate 
regulators should ensure they are familiar with and consider extant best practice models 
for corporate governance of financial reporting issues when developing new, or revising 
existing accounting regulations. 
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Broad chronology of share-based payment arrangements 
Date Event Importance/Implication 
1920 , Emergence of share Initiative of the 'Roaring 20s share market 
options boom 
1950s US reduces taxes on share Firms begin using share options for executive 
sales payment 
1972 F ASB decides not to Use of share options continues 
mandate expensing 
1975-1985 Bull run in share markets, Demand for executive compensation 
emergence of corporate commensurate with superstar status 
superstars 
1984 Microsoft offers share Use of share options as a component of non-
options to all employees executive employee compensation 
popularised 
1990s Bull run in some major Use of employee share option plans 
share markets mUltiplies 
1994 F ASB requires footnote Warnings of overstated earnings due to non-
disclosure for share recognition of share options 
options 
2001 Enron files for bankruptcy Enron CEO testifies before US Congress on 
importance of employee share options 
2003 Microsoft abandons share Possible decrease in the use of share options 
options in favour of share and increase in the use of share award plans 
awards 
2005 IFRS2 effective, mandates Regulatory impact includes earnings dilution 
expensing of share options 
2007 BFRS2 effective What else? 
Source: Fisher C and Wise V (2006) (adapted from Nowicki 2006), adapted to include BFRS2 in 
2007. 
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